

JPRS 74956

17 January 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2068



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74956	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle NFAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2068			5. Report Date 17 January 1980
7. Author(s)			6.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.
			11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)
			13. Type of Report & Period Covered
			14.
15. Supplementary Notes			
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.			
17. Document Analysis a Descriptors			
Political Science	<u>Inter-Arab Affairs</u>	<u>Libya</u>	<u>X Sultunate</u>
Sociology	<u>North African</u>	<u>Mauritania</u>	<u>of Oman</u>
Economics	<u>Affairs</u>	<u>X Morocco</u>	<u>Syria</u>
Culture (Social Sciences)	<u>Afghanistan</u>	<u>X People's Democratic Republic of Yemen</u>	<u>X Tunisia</u>
Ethnology	<u>X Algeria</u>	<u>Persian Gulf Area</u>	<u>United Arab Emirates</u>
Geography	<u>Bahrain</u>	<u>Qatar</u>	<u>X Western Sahara</u>
Techological	<u>Egypt</u>	<u>Saudi Arabia</u>	<u>Yemen Arab Republic</u>
Military Sciences	<u>X Iraq</u>	<u>Spanish North Africa</u>	
	<u>X Israel</u>	<u>Sudan</u>	
	<u>Jordan</u>		
	<u>Kuwait</u>		
	<u>X Lebanon</u>		
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms			
c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15			
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 61
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price

17 January 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2068

CONTENTS	PAGE
ALGERIA	
Briefs	
Defense Ministry Official Received	1
Natural Gas Ban Refuted	1
IRAQ	
Development Projects in al-Ta'min Completed (AL-THAWRAH, 27 Nov 79).....	2
Briefs	
Iron, Steel Production	4
Aid to Somalia	4
Use of Checks Urged	5
Kurdish Democratic Party Meeting	5
ISRAEL	
Problems Facing Iran Considered (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 11 Nov 79).....	7
American Foreign Policy Criticized (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 25 Nov 79).....	9
Understanding on Supply of Oil From Sinai to Israel Reached (Editorial; HAZOFEH, 6 Nov 79).....	11
U.S. Strategy on Iran Analyzed (Editorial; AL-SHA'B, 25 Nov 79).....	13
NRP Policy of Settlement in Judaea, Samaria Upheld (Editorial; HAZOFEH, 6 Nov 79).....	15

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Refusal of Superior Soldiers To Become Officers Discussed (Zeev Shif; HA'ARETZ, 14 Nov 79).....	17
Dealings With Weapons Export Agent Related (Nahum Barne'a, Yosef Periel; DAVAR, 14 Nov 79).....	21
Storming of Sacred Mosque, Case of Nabulus Mayor Viewed (Editorial; AL-QUDS, 22 Nov 79).....	26

LEBANON

Shi'ite Shaykh Shams-al-Din Speaks on Threat to South (Nazih Naquzi; AL-ANWAR, 9 Nov 79).....	28
Lebanese UN Ambassador Views UN Forces in Labanon, Syria's Stand (Ghassan Tuwayni Interview; AL-HAWADITH, 21 Dec 79).. <td>32</td>	32
Graduation of Army NCO Cadets Celebrated (AL-ANWAR, 9 Nov 79).....	38
Banking Statistics Reported for Four-Week Period (L'ORIENT-LE JOUR, 7, 21 Nov 79).....	39
Briefs Statement on Iran-Libyan Normalization	42

MOROCCO

Briefs Commission Meeting With Romania	43
---	----

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Text of Friendship Treaty With USSR Reported (AL-HADAF, 10 Nov 79).....	44
--	----

SULTANATE OF OMAN

Objectives of PFLO Reviewed (AL-HADAF, 10 Nov 79).....	48
---	----

TUNISIA

Briefs Mecca Incident	51
--------------------------	----

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

WESTERN SAHARA

Algeria Seeking To Include POLISARIO in Saharan Talks (LE MONDE, 11-12 Nov 79).....	52
POLISARIO Claims Attack Near Bou-Craa (LE MONDE, 11-12 Nov 79).....	55
Algeria Warns Morocco About Operation 'OHOUD' (LE MONDE, 9 Nov 79).....	56
Communist Parties' Support for POLISARIO (LE MONDE, 17 Nov 79).....	58

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIAL RECEIVED--President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Republic and Secretary General of the Party, this evening received Col Kasdi Merbah, secretary general of the National Defense Ministry and member of the Political Bureau, who reported on his mission to the Soviet Union as leader of a military delegation. [Text] [LD192316 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 19 Dec 79 LD]

NATURAL GAS BAN REFUTED--Sources close to the National Sonatrach Company confirmed that it had not taken any decision on the export of Algerian gas to the Netherlands. This clarification came as a reply to rumors spread by a foreign news agency citing Dutch political quarters which were reported to have said that Algeria had decided not to sell natural gas to the Netherlands. The sources close to Sonatrach added that a series of meetings are planned with various clients, including the Dutch, early in 1980. The question behind all this is whether the aim of the rumors is to indirectly exercise pressure on Algeria or whether they represent an introduction to a change in the policy of importing Algerian gas by the Netherlands. [Text] [LD192320 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 19 Dec 79 LD]

CSO: 4402

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN AL-TA'MIN COMPLETED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 27 Nov 79 p 6

[Article: "Various Development Projects in al-Ta'mim Governorate Completed: Roads, Schools, Homes, Irrigation Canals"]

[Text] During the present year the agencies of the socialist sector in al-Ta'mim Governorate have completed and have begun implementing new projects that have a total cost of 235 million dinars.

This announcement was made by Mr 'Adil 'Abdallah, the governor of al-Ta'mim. He said that agricultural, oil, educational, health and service projects have been completed at a cost of 63 million dinars. These projects included digging two principal canals, each of which was 30 kilometers long. This was part of the first phase of the Kirkuk Irrigation Project that is to supply the water that is necessary to irrigate 500,000 donums to the areas that are stretched across the districts of Dabas and al-Huwayjah and the capital, Kirkuk. This will follow the project's principal supply schedule in mid 1982; the setting up of hydroelectric control devices on the network of canals; and the construction of 21 homes for those who are associated with the project.

The governorate's Roads Directorate has finished paving 10 principal roads that are 358 kilometers long. They are the Kirkuk-Tikrit Road; Kirkuk-Daquq; al-Hawijah-Butmah--the socialist farm; al-Hawijah-Manzalah-Ba'iji; al-Rabi'-Sedan; Dibs-Qarah Juk; Taqtaq-Ilinjagh; Qadir Karam-Sinkaw; and Sinkaw-Qarah Dagh.

The autonomous rule department completed construction of 87 elementary schools, 8 intermediate schools, 6 secondary schools, 4 kindergartens, 405 housing units for workers and employees and a health center for popular organizations. At the same time the Public Organization for the Northern Oil completed the expansion of the water retention station in the district of Dibs; it completed laying a complex of oil and gas pipes; and it completed construction of 500 homes for the organization's workers.

The governorate's Buildings Directorate built warehouses for storing drugs, a laboratory for pathological tests and government buildings.

At the same time the governorate's Waqf Division built six mosques in the villages of the Egyptian peasants on the Kirkuk-Kubri Road. The governorate's hospitals and medical clinics have been expanded, the new therapeutic centers have been added. A number of streets in the capital, the districts and the subdistricts of the governorate have been paved.

The governor added that these agencies had undertaken new development projects whose costs amount to 172 million dinars.

The Administration of the Kirkuk Irrigation Project has undertaken the implementation of a group of principal and subsidiary canals that make up an irrigation system for the land of a stage of the project. In addition, the administration has implemented a project to ensure the flow of water in a river, especially the one which flows through the city of Kirkuk where torrential streams overflow during the winter season.

Work has begun to implement the al-Ta'mim Cement Plant to produce 1 million tons of cement annually. At the same time, implementation of the Kirkuk Mosul Road Project was begun.

The Public Organization for Northern Oil has begun building a number of oil industry projects and 600 homes for those who are associated with it.

8592

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

IRON, STEEL PRODUCTION--Our national cadres have achieved significant progress during a short period of time by putting in operation the principal sections of the Iron and Steel Complex which is currently being implemented in Khawr al-Zubayr Bay in Basrah [Governorate]. Mr Tariq 'Abd-al-Hadi, director general of the Public Organization for Iron and Steel in Khawr al-Zubayr, said that the Iraqi cadre had received two out of four furnaces for smelting iron and that the capacity of each one was 70 tons per single smelting operation. Mr 'Abd-al-Hadi also said that the rolling section had been delivered and that it had been put into operation with a high [degree of] efficiency. He said that the two other furnaces will be delivered soon. He added that during the period of experimental operation the complex had produced 14,000 tons of iron and iron bars (al-shish) and that production was in accordance with the specifications that had been agreed to in the contract. The Public Company for Iron and Lumber will place these products on the market soon. Mr 'Abd-al-Hadi explained that work was presently underway to complete the sponge iron project which is considered complementary to the Iron and Steel Complex since it will supply it with basic primary materials. He affirmed that the sponge iron industry was considered one of the very modern industries. A new cadre for that industry had been prepared by means of training courses abroad and within the project. He indicated that there were five service units for the iron and steel plants: the al-Nurah production unit; the gas production plant; the secondary power station; a water filtering unit; mechanical and electrical workshops; and a training center for the complex. [Text] [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Nov 79 p 7] 8592

AID TO SOMALIA--Iraq announced that it would donate 20 million dollars to Somalia. The announcement was made this afternoon while the second closed session of the Tenth Arab Summit Conference was in session. Arab kings and heads of state heard a review of the situation in Somalia that was presented by Somalian President Mohamed Siad Barre during that session. Saudi Arabia also announced that it was donating a comparable sum [Text] [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 23 Nov 79 p 1] 8592

USE OF CHECKS URGED--Mr Tala Yasin Ramadan member of the Revolutionary Command Council [and] first deputy prime minister called upon all ministries to encourage the increased use of checks instead of currency in processing most daily exchange operations for the public and for organizations. This [appeal] was made in a public statement that was issued yesterday to the ministries and to the organizations of the socialist sector. The public statement affirmed that as a phenomenon, check transactions would have major economic effects on the different aspects of economic activity such as savings, the amassment of money, demand for goods, and, accordingly, the course of development and economic equilibrium in the country. The public statement indicated that check transactions would provide the objective circumstances for increasing the public's bank transactions, for increasing business for banking institutions in the country and upgrading their effectiveness and for achieving the goals of the credit plan. The public statement required socialist sector organizations to accept from their agents who have bank deposits or real property ordinary checks whose value is limited to that of the securities. The statement called upon governmental departments and socialist sector organizations to open checking accounts in the al-Rafidin Bank for civil servants who voluntarily wish to have them and whose nominal salaries exceed 100 dinars. The public statement affirmed that governmental departments and socialist sector organizations must accept and cash ordinary checks written by their associates who have checking accounts at the Rafidayn Bank, provided that the value of a single check not exceed 25 dinars. The public statement required the Rafidayn Bank to take all the possible measures and to make all the necessary arrangement to facilitate the implementation of these decisions and to make the preparations and the changes that are necessary for expanding check transactions in general in the coming stages. [Text] [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 23 Nov 79 p 6] 8592

KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEETING--Mr Hashim Hasan 'Aqrawi secretary of the Central Committee of the Kurdish Democratic Party spoke at the beginning of the expanded party meeting. He affirmed the importance of adhering to the valuable instructions and directives which the president and fighting commander Saddam Husayn had favored us with during the meetings of the Council of Ministers and during his excellency's tours and visits to the state's different facilities. The secretary of the party's Central Committee praised the pioneering experiment of putting democratic values and principles into practice. This experiment had taken place in a number of production and service establishments in the presence and under the supervision of the president. Workers had elected their own representatives directly to manage projects and organizations. Mr 'Aqrawi said that the fact that our people are putting such principles into practice stems from the fact that the goals and values of the great 17-30 July Revolution are humanitarian; they express the principles of the struggle of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. Mr Hashim Hasan 'Aqrawi made it clear that the Revolutionary Command in our country had faith and confidence in the abilities of our people and in the opinions and suggestions they expressed on various

matters and questions. This is because the revolution came into existence for the welfare and prosperity of our public. The secretary of the party praised the democratic initiative of the leadership of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and of the 17-30 July Revolution in presenting the two bills for discussion by the National and Patriotic Progressive Front and by all professional and popular unions and associations so that their opinions and suggestions may be acknowledged before the laws are issued. Mr 'Aqrawi also reviewed the patriotic and humanitarian positions of the 17-30 July Revolution and its support for the movements of struggling nations in the world. The Revolution has placed all available capabilities at the service of the battle of destiny against the racist Zionist entity, and it has rejected the treacherous and capitulatory agreement, the Camp David Agreement, which the traitor al-Sadat had dared to accept. Those who were assembled discussed the bills in a strong democratic spirit that was appreciative of the initiative that the leadership of the party and of the revolution manifested in proposing the bill for discussion. [Text]
[Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 24 Nov 79 p 3] 8592

CSO: 4802

PROBLEMS FACING IRAN CONSIDERED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 11 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Problems of the Iranian Revolution"]

[Text] Undoubtedly, there is in Iran a revolution which aims at building a new society which is completely different from the one which preceded it. And undoubtedly, the leader of the revolution, Imam Khomeyni, enjoys widespread popularity and has complete control over the masses.

The Iranian revolution is a popular revolution in which the people participated. Every individual was given the right to express his opinion and benefit from the revolution's gains. It is a revolution which has no precedents except the French revolution, which turned European society upside down and whose slogans spread beyond the borders of France, and the Bolshevik revolution, which was led by Lenin and whose banners were carried beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.

The Egyptian revolution of our own era, however, does not fall within the same category as the French and Bolshevik revolutions. For the revolution in Egypt was carried out by the army, whose most difficult problems included transmitting the perception of the revolution to the Egyptian masses, who had remained isolated from the revolutionary drive.

We return to the Iranian revolution and the problems, both internal and external, it is now facing. The internal problems of the revolution are attributable to the make-up of the Iranian people and can easily be overcome. The revolutionary mentality is characterized by belief in peoples, and it will inevitably find solutions which are acceptable to the ethnic minorities so that they can live in peace and brotherhood within the Iranian nation and under its sovereignty.

The foreign problems, on the other hand, are more difficult and more intractable. For the true revolutionary does not accept half solutions, or concessions, or compromises at the expense of the principles and doctrines of the revolution. When we lived in a world of reciprocal interests and close distances, there was no place in it for inflexible

revolutionary positions. Indeed, such positions were in danger of being smashed.

Imam Khomeyni's problem is that he is simultaneously a revolutionary who believes in his revolution, and the ruling force in domestic and foreign relations. Thus, the difficulty which he faces is to integrate the ideological revolution and political rule, which requires flexibility and compromise.

Iran, which has the largest arsenal of American weapons, cannot effectively maintain these weapons unless it obtains the spare parts produced by American factories. Failing this, these splendid and complex weapons will turn into piles of junk and mountains of steel covered with rust.

Lenin the ideologist worked through Stalin the politician. Mao the strong man of the revolution in China remained remote from the reins of government, turning them over to his political premier, Zhou Enlai, Gandhi refused to participate in the government after he had achieved India's independence, preferring to devote himself to his philosophy and ideology. Thus he turned the government over to Nehru.

Khomeyni--the believing strong man who does not accept truces, settlements or compromises--must find a way out of his crisis and the crisis of Iran. For the Iranian revolution must inevitably deal with others, and it cannot live in isolation from the world given the extensive interests it shares with a number of sides. The political sphere demands flexibility and both open and secret maneuvers, and this conflicts with the mentality of the pure revolutionary. Herein lies the problem between the inflexibility of the revolutionary and the flexibility of the politician.

8591

CSO: 4802

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CRITICIZED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 25 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial: "America Reaps the Fruits of Its Policy"]

[Text] The United States as a great power is facing a big test--not just in Iran with the crisis there but in other places as well, although Iran is the hottest and most prominent of them at this time.

The fact is that American policy is meeting criticism and opposition in places ranging from South America to certain African states, the Middle East, Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The reason for this is that American policy has always backed individual rulers and persons who profit from various systems of government at the expense of the people in general and at the expense of its own interests as well.

For this reason, these individuals have been toppled and their peoples have revolted against them and against America, which had allied itself with them. Thus the American accounts are taking a turn for the worse.

Although we do not want at this time to go into the background and details of official American relations with the non-Arab countries--which in most cases are generally known--American policy on the Arab states in general, and the Palestinian issue in particular, provides an overall picture of the nature of American policy with regard to peoples and issues throughout the world.

We observe that instead of making radical changes in their policies, positions and dealings with regard to the states of the world, successive American administrations have constantly endeavored to dampen and extinguish the fires rather than eliminate the causes of these fires. Thus, no sooner have things calmed down for awhile than they erupt again more violently than expected.

The Arab-Israeli conflict contains the most obvious proof of what we say. For the American administration does not strive to produce a radical solution based on justice and the curbing of expansion, but attempts to keep

the situation from exploding and achieve a settlement that will bring pacification. Pacification may be achieved for awhile, but a settlement will not be achieved and the pacification will remain temporary. And American will reap the fruits of its policy.

8591

CSO: 4862

UNDERSTANDING ON SUPPLY OF OIL FROM SINAI TO ISRAEL REACHED

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 6 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "A Day of Perversities Followed by Understanding"]

[Text] The details of the statement by the minister of defense in Cairo, who reached an understanding with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on the prices of oil from Sinai, which will be supplied to Israel, will be presented to the government and then to the Knesset. Oil supply in the necessary amount and at reasonable prices is vital for the country's economy. Therefore, voices demanding that the oil field in 'Alma should not be returned to Egypt as long as an orderly supply at reasonable prices was not promised were heard.

Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and Energy Minister Yitzhak Modai spent 2 days in oil negotiations in Cairo. The representatives of Egypt, especially Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil, showed inflexibility during the talks and there was fear that the parties would not reach any settlement.

On the basis of these difficulties the Shamir-Cohen faction called for non-confidence in the government, whose supporters had only three votes, while the opposition refrained from voting. The argument was that returning the oil field in Sinai to Egypt was a "national suicide." The government spokesman answered that an annual supply of 2 million tons of oil at world market prices was promised. The debate was on the amount of the price.

Now the minister of defense has announced that "we have reached an understanding and there is no oil problem between Egypt and Israel." Indeed, Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil did not hold a concluding round of talks with Weizman and it is believed that he is not pleased with the "understanding" in the statement by the Israeli minister of defense. But at the meeting between Sadat and Weizman a positive statement was given to reporters. Sadat said: "There is no problem, say in my name that there is no problem." Weizman concluded that he reached an understanding with the Egyptian president on the prices of oil.

Sadat promised a settlement of the problem. Khalil avoided conclusions. Egyptian Petroleum Minister Akhmad Hilal announced that "there were still a few administrative problems requiring a solution." He added that he would soon meet with Minister Modai near the oil field in 'Alma before it was turned over to Egypt at the end of the month.

When the two ministers returned to Israel, they made a general statement that after a day of perversities they reached an agreed framework, according to which the oil matter would be settled. Sadat's intervention was a positive factor. Understanding in oil matters means a regular supply and reasonable prices. Since this paragraph is important in the peace agreement, it is to be hoped that Egypt, which is receiving oil wells discovered by Israel in Sinai, will honor its commitments.

11,439

CSO: 4805

U.S. STRATEGY ON IRAN ANALYZED

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial: "The Americans Are Coming"]

[Text] With the clanking of American weapons and the sounds of the war drums beaten by the administration of President Carter growing louder, it has become evident that a limited American strike against Iranian targets has become an existent and thinkable possibility.

When we examine the United States' motives for carrying out such an operation, we find many justifications. Having lost its base of operations in the Iran of the shah, Washington wants to strike at the revolutionary center which the Iranian revolution constitutes, thus confirming for its agents in the Gulf and other areas of the world that it has renounced the policy of reluctance to protect them which was evident in the cases of Van Thieu, Lon Nol, the shah and Somoza, among others.

Moreover, the probable American strike against Iran would eliminate--so the Carter administration imagines--the problem of Viet Nam, which has shackled American policy during the last half of the 1970's, and by continuing the contemptible propaganda campaign against Iran within the United States and abroad, it will be possible to test the mobilization of public opinion to accept a new venture in Iran.

Besides all this, the race to the White House--which began early and enthusiastically this year--will compel Carter to try to appear in the role of a national hero rallying the nation around him to confront fateful and sensitive problems, after public opinion polls have showed that he is considered the weakest leader, in terms of personality, in American history.

Undoubtedly, the American administration believes that by aiming a military strike at the Iran of the revolution, it could free itself from the humiliation which American pride suffered at the hands of the people of Iran, and that such a strike would enable it to ensure oil sources and

to shake the stick of intimidation at the peoples of the Gulf if they were to attempt to imitate the Iranian revolution.

On the other side of the coin, these American intentions which disregard the logic of the era constitute a threat to all peoples in the world and to all liberation movements and progressive and nonaligned forces in the world. From this fact stems the necessity that these forces form a bloc behind the Iranian people in order to prevent any American military ventures, which would have serious effects on the peace of the entire world, and to support the Iran of the revolution if it is subjected to such ventures.

The coming days would appear pregnant with momentous events. However, we are confident that the people which overthrew the shah's regime is able, with the support of its friends and allies, to confront and defeat the United States.

8591

CSO: 4802

NRP POLICY OF SETTLEMENT IN JUDAEA, SAMARIA UPHELD

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 6 Nov 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Public Basis for Settlement Pioneers"]

[Text] The government decision to hold a special session that would discuss the settlement plan in Judaea and Samaria was accepted at the initiative of NRP ministers. This plan, when its goals are accepted, will also include a general solution for the matter of Elon Moreh, which will be transferred to a substitute location in a nearby place.

The settlement policy of the government, to the ways of implementation of which there are different approaches, after the decision of the High Court of Justice on the matter of Elon Moreh, must determine without delay the possibility of removing legal obstacles to the localization of settlements, just as the establishment of a significant number of settlements by the necessary means must be ensured.

The NRP representatives in the government and the Knesset are in the forefront of the fight for settlement at all its stages. Their position is fundamental--settlement of all the parts of the Land of Israel--and reinforced with political and security arguments. The NRP, which is a partner in the coalition, sees in settlement a matter of the utmost importance.

At a meeting of the representatives of Torah and 'Avodah [Torah and Labor] settlements in the Golan Heights, Gush 'Ezyon, valleys and mountains in Judaea and Samaria and so forth, convened by Knesset member Rabbi Hayim Drukman in the Shapira Center, the demand was made that the NRP leadership exhaust all the possibilities for advancing the settlement in Judaea and Samaria before autonomy is put into effect. Speeding up is desirable at all times and, especially, at the time when we run against time.

The decision of the High Court of Justice on the matter of Elon Moreh evoked anxiety, anger and confusion in connection with the steps that must be taken in order to prevent a serious clash and, at the same time, to maintain the settlement in the region. An orderly implementation of the

proposals on the agenda, both for the settlement of Elon Moreh and the general settlement, may be the way out of the complex situation. This is a responsible and substantive approach that seeks to solve problems without a confrontation or crisis.

The settlement in Judaea and Samaria can be realized within the framework of this government, whose principle is the country's integrity, and with the indirect intervention of the NRP this settlement will be accelerated and expanded at the possible speed and rate.

These basic facts are known well to all those that examine things as they are, without empty words or futile demonstrations. Hence the few voices at the meeting that urged "departure from the NRP" are of those that follow extreme slogans expressed in empty verbiage.

The members of Torah and 'Avodah settlements, who aspire for an established Jewish society in the land of their fathers, have always viewed themselves as real pioneers of the religious Zionist movement. With its public and educational means the movement prepared the ground for settlement and educated a generation of settlers. This network established the big enterprise of Torah and 'Avodah settlements in all the parts of the Land of Israel.

With empty vociferous substitutes, such as the organization of a mixture of secular and religious people who spread slogans contradicting the heritage of religious Zionism in its historical courses, real achievements will never be attained in the Land of Israel.

It is inconceivable that the adventurism of those that lost their heads, which only causes disruptions in positive public activity, will attract serious factors. There should be no "departure from the NRP," but encouragement of the national-religious representatives in the government and Knesset to act with all their force to implement government decisions in the most positive way. This is the way to maintain settlement worthy of its name in Judaea and Samaria.

11,439

CSO: 4805

REFUSAL OF SUPERIOR SOLDIERS TO BECOME OFFICERS DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Nov 79 p 9

[Article by Zeev Shif: "Recalcitrants Volunteer"]

[Text] Those that wish to examine the question of volunteering and motivation in the IDF encounter two conflicting and opposing phenomena existing side by side. On the one hand, there is a great deal of volunteering for the volunteer battle units. Not only is there no shortage of volunteers for units where the danger to soldiers and training difficulties are much greater, but there are several candidates for every place. Recruits seek favoritism in order to enter these units.

On the other hand, there is the phenomenon of a decline in general motivation. Fewer good people are prepared to be officers in the IDF. People with good natural attributes refuse to receive training as officers and some of them even go so far as to inflict "deliberate damage" on themselves during examinations for the officer corps. They are the "recalcitrants of the officer corps."

But what seems even stranger is the fact that a significant number of the "recalcitrants of the officer corps" come from volunteers for the choice battle units. On the one hand, a young man is prepared to expose himself to danger in service in a dangerous battle unit (paratroop, reconnaissance and similar units) and, on the other, for some reason he is not prepared to go to the school for officers. This, in fact, is a contradiction in terms. The contradiction is much greater when it turns out more than once that the recalcitrants of the officer corps from the choice battle units receive cooperation in this matter from their commanders.

The main reason for the refusal of the recalcitrants of the officer corps in the choice units to go to the school for officers is that the candidates are afraid that at the end of their training they will not be returned to their units. Indeed, only some of them can be returned to their original units. The administrative staff distributes them among various other units in order to raise the general standard. Soldiers in the choice units, who are capable of being superior officers, prefer to remain enlisted men so long as this ensures their stay in their units.

Many of their commanders only think of the "interests" of their unit and thus hurt the IDF in general. They send those that they feel that will be returned to the unit and that are not always the best to the course for officers. "This is an erroneous calculation of the private backyard, not of the public," says the manpower branch of the General Staff. It seems that this phenomenon is quite serious, because for some time there has been an instruction demanding that everyone that serves in a volunteer unit and refuses to go to the course for officers be transferred from a volunteer unit to another unit. This is a sanction against the recalcitrant and, in fact, against his commander and unit as well. This strict instruction has remained in force now when changes have been introduced in the order of the General Staff dealing with the recalcitrants of the officer corps.

There is no doubt that this "recalcitrance" among the volunteers for the choice battle units is reflected in the level of those that come to the school for officers. This is a phenomenon that must cause concern and, if it continues for another few years, it is bound to be reflected in the entire military system. It turns out that, owing to this phenomenon, the IDF is forced to admit soldiers of a lower caliber to the school for officers. In other words, the "threshold of entrance" to the school for officers has been lowered owing to the shortage of candidates of a higher caliber.

In the examinations for the school for officers there are grades up to 30. All those that have more than 13 are admitted to the course. Those that have 11 and 12 can pass provided they appear before a special committee and receive a recommendation from a senior commander. The above-mentioned decline is expressed in the fact that the IDF is forced to accept more soldiers with grades 11-13, but not those with a lower grade.

These phenomena are sufficient to make part of the senior command anxious and nervous, especially when the majority of the experts are convinced that the professional specialization of the junior officer now requires a longer time. Among other things, these needs resulted in the decision to prolong the period of service in the regular army on the part of all those that undergo officer training. This created a counterreaction--increase in the number of recalcitrants of the officer corps. The increase in the number of recalcitrants caused a feeling of disappointment and failure among the commanders of various corps and some of them decided to use partisan methods of handling the recalcitrants of the officer corps. They did not satisfy themselves with official instructions, but used sanctions of their own. In many cases they were unnecessary humiliations.

This pointed, most of all, to the educational and informational failure of some of the senior commanders and their educational officers. When they lost their persuasive ability, they angrily resorted to humiliating punishments. When I expressed this argument to some of them, for the most part, they answered that the educational failure was not theirs, nor of the IDF, but, first of all, of the homes and schools from where the recalcitrants came.

Of course, psychologists in the IDF oppose any punishment and they certainly object to methods of humiliation. They say that there must be publicity stating that "to be an officer in the IDF is a privilege. If you refuse to be an officer, you lose!" Commanders say that all this is fine, but, in the meantime, there is a shortage of officers and, if the instruction to sign for 1 year of regular service is canceled, the level will drop. One would like to use this nice method, but the needs are pressing and urgent.

Number of Recalcitrants Was Doubled

The truth is that the phenomenon of recalcitrants of the officer corps is not characteristic of our period, nor of the period following the Yom Kippur War. There were always those who refused to be officers even though they were suitable for this and were not required at all to serve in the regular army. In reconnaissance and in NAHAL the phenomenon of refusal to go to a course for officers is not new. The problem became aggravated after the Yom Kippur War when the need for officers increased owing to the losses and growth of the army. Then it was decided to train part of the officer corps during reserve service. Immediately there was the possibility that there would be soldiers in compulsory service who would prefer to go to a course for officers during reserve service in order to avoid regular service (in the past this addition ranged between 6 to 8 months. In 1972 a decision was made on regular service of 6 months). In order to prevent this, it was decided then--and the instruction has remained in effect to this day--that those that refuse to go to a course for officers during compulsory service will not be sent to this course during reserve service unless the adjutant-general of the IDF decides otherwise.

There was another development last August. It was decided to prolong the period of regular service to a whole year. Immediately there was a significant decline in the readiness to go to a course for officers. The main argument given by the recalcitrants was their desire to study. The number of recalcitrants almost doubled. The situation continued until this February when there was an additional examination and it was found that the number of recalcitrants began to drop. This drop continued and this June it was disclosed that the number of recalcitrants was smaller than in February.

The situation is not yet as it was before the service was prolonged to 1 year, but the manpower branch believes that this trend will continue until it stabilizes. The manpower branch explains that after the first shock 1-year service becomes an accepted phenomenon. Incidentally, it should be stated that this concerns land forces alone. The IDF has no problems connected with commitment to a long service by pilots and officers in the Air Force, nor by those accepted for a course of sailors in the navy.

The public debate on the matter of the recalcitrants of the officer corps, which only scratched the surface of the problem, led the IDF to a renewed debate of the problem. The General Staff referred to this matter at one of its meetings. Following this new instructions to major-generals, as well as a new order of the General Staff on the matter of the recalcitrants of the officer corps, were issued. This order instructs unit commanders to do more in order to encourage suitable soldiers to go to the school for officers and not to leave this to their good will. They are now ordered to engage in personal publicity.

Humiliation Is Forbidden

The new order defines most clearly the recalcitrant of the officer corps (the person that refuses to undergo examinations for the officer corps or to volunteer for regular service for the required period; the person that deliberately removes himself from a course for officers or from a corps course preparing him to be an officer; the person that refuses to return to a course for officers after he is taken out of it for other reasons and is not required to sign for regular service in excess of the regular period) and the person that has a right to declare that a certain soldier is a recalcitrant of the officer corps.

Former sanctions consisting of positive and negative precepts have remained in force. A recalcitrant of the officer corps will not enjoy an early discharge in order to engage in academic studies. The person that refuses to go to a course in compulsory service will not be trained for this in reserve service, only if there is a special approval for this. The instruction that a recalcitrant of the officer corps in a volunteer unit will be taken out of the unit, but will be entitled to wear the insignia of the unit (such as a red cap or red shoes of paratroopers) has remained in force. New instructions were added to this: The person that is taken out of his unit because he is a recalcitrant of the officer corps will be given a job corresponding to his military training and occupation. In other words, if a commander decides to make a recalcitrant of the officer corps into a battalion guard or a cook, he will disobey the instruction.

There is another addition. It is forbidden to humiliate a soldier because of his recalcitrance. Not only is it forbidden to take humiliating steps when a soldier is reassigned and given a new job, but also any other humiliating steps. This did not require a new order of the General Staff. It is forbidden to humiliate a soldier in any event. The order of the General Staff clarifies and regulates things, but the problem has remained. Its partial solution is connected with appropriate publicity among soldiers and commanders. It seems to me that not enough has been done in this area.

DEALINGS WITH WEAPONS EXPORT AGENT RELATED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Nov 79 p 5

/Article by Nahum Barnea and Yosef Periel: "The Strength of an Agent"/

/Text/ On 6 February 1969 Elhanan Yishay, head of the delegation of the Israeli aircraft industry in Latin America, sent a letter to Yosef Tzeh-nover, director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among other things, Yishay wrote the following:

"In a written instruction I was asked to get away from the ambassadors, who need not be involved in our affairs. We must not communicate with an IDF representative who cannot proceed to the order of the day in connection with an agent's actions and we were warned that those who communicated with him would be immediately recalled to Israel.

"When the aircraft company of state A* sought a direct contact with us without the agent, we were forbidden to go there. When the minister of finance of that state with the president's knowledge announced that he did not want the agent to appear on behalf of the aircraft industry because he hurt the administration, we were told that we did not know the truth and that we must not communicate with him. We argued that in that state the agent was "burned" and it was a pity to lose business deals, but our warnings were not heeded and only when the situation became desperate was the handling of the matter transferred to (agent) Ayzenberg.

"When the minister of defense (Weizman) determined that the agent should not be given more than 15 percent, we were notified through internal correspondence that he would be paid percentage 'from above.' Our inquiries as to why this agent was treated in such an unusual way and why he was paid such sums, when other agents were paid 4 or 5 percent and a maximum of 10 percent in extraordinary cases, remained unanswered.

*In order not to hurt Israeli export deals now or in the future, we refrain from naming people or states.

"When for weeks we wanted to comply with the request of government B, we were told that we should not do so. The government sought a direct contact with the aircraft industry or the government and, therefore, this request was denied.

"When the authorities of government C requested through the military attache a direct contact with us, we were instructed to take with us the agent as the financial representative of the delegation. The members of the (secret) services of that state told the military attache that they did not understand how we operated.

"When I was in Israel, I spoke with Hertzela Ron, legal adviser to the aircraft industry, and she told me that she wholeheartedly recommended that a contract not be signed with Katz (the agent) for more than 1 year, but according to the instruction of the director-general (Gavriel Gidur) she was forced to sign for 3 years. She also told me that each time she made remarks on the subject of Katz and, especially, when she remarked that this was against the law, she was rebuked in such a way that she decided not to raise questions concerning Katz any longer."

Elhanan Yishay's letter ends here. Subsequently, we will present the answers of the aircraft industry to the complaints made in it. Yishay, one of Ben-Gurion's closest assistants and one of the veteran directors of the aircraft industry, was sent to Latin America in the middle of 1978 to open an office of the aircraft industry there. As a reliable source in the management of the aircraft industry now says, one of the important tasks of Yishay and of the big team that he took with him was to put an end to the work of Markus Katz as an agent within 3 years, but Yishay tried to speed up matters.

A Controversial Figure

Who is David Markus (Mordekhay) Katz? Unfortunately, all our attempts to speak with this man or with his representatives in Israel last week failed. Our repeated appeals to the office of attorneys Hertzog-Neeman, which represented Katz at least in one matter, ran into a stone wall. We were told that attorney Ya'akov Neeman was appointed director-general of the Ministry of Finance and, therefore, could not answer us. Attorney Hayim Hertzog was abroad and the other attorneys could not answer the questions that we wanted to ask.

The publication of the first article in the series yesterday gave rise to trans-Atlantic conversations, as a result of which attorney Aharon Asa from Jerusalem contacted us and requested a meeting.

In addition to attorney Asa, attorney Mikhael Katz also participated in the meeting held yesterday. Both attorneys introduced themselves as concerned personal friends of Katz. Asa, who recorded the conversation on a tape recorder, said that, although Katz knew about this conversation, his

statements were not known to him. Since he answered that he was not authorized to speak in the name of Katz, we again requested an immediate contact with Katz or with some other authorized person.

Katz, who according to his friends left Israel before the 1948 war, now is an agent of about 17 Israeli enterprises, some of them suppliers of defense equipment headed by the aircraft industry and the military industry. He frequently visits Israel and meets with political figures to whom he is close, some of them in Likud and NRP. He is known to be close to minister Hamer and to Knesset member Ben-Meir and to contribute to religious funds. His public activity focused attention on him, which displeased the weapons industries that he represents. On the other hand, among senior government echelons an impression was created that Katz had the backing of political circles, including circles close to the prime minister.

The activities of Katz also evoked reservations among the senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the basis of these reservations this year Moshe Dayan, minister of foreign affairs, made an appeal to the prime minister. As far as it is known, this appeal was transferred to the minister of defense.

The aircraft industry admits that Weizman does not like the use of weapons agents in general and the activity of Katz in particular. At the same time, it seems that Weizman's personal views did not affect the policy of the aircraft industry. On the contrary, his personal involvement in matters concerning weapons agents is received with clear reservations.

The present directors of the aircraft industry are not happy to assume responsibility for the policy set by previous director Al Schwimer and previous chairman Mikhael Piron and for the decisions adopted during the office of the two previous ministers of defense Dayan and Peres. In the statements made by the enterprise management there is criticism of the generous terms given at that time.

According to the heads of the aircraft industry, Katz has been an agent of the enterprise in Central America for 14 years. According to them, Katz opened the way for the export deals of the enterprise in the region. In the last few years the number of the deals that Katz succeeded in closing has declined and, according to them, he is not among the big agents there. The aircraft industry claims that after the appointment of Gavriel Gidor as director-general 2 years ago, the contracts of agents were changed gradually, the rates of commission were lowered and uniform contracts were signed. According to them, the new amended contract of Katz was signed in February 1979 for 3 years. According to the claims of the enterprise, one can see in Katz a characteristic, not unusual, model for an agent's work.

The aircraft industry claims that today the government allows it to pay agents a commission of up to 10 percent. When it is interested in paying a commission at a higher rate, this calls for the approval of defense and finance ministers. Another guideline of the minister of defense established that with regard to "certain" civil deals a commission of up to 15 percent will be accepted with understanding.

The director of a large weapons agency with whom we talked said that the commissions accepted in the world market are at the most 4 to 5 percent and this in cases of small and complicated deals. As a deal increases, the commission decreases and often does not exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ percent. The aircraft industry replies to this that the fact that an agent must share his money with others raises the commission rate. The Ministry of Defense refused to answer the questions addressed to it on this matter in writing.

The agreements with Katz underwent a number of changes unusual in their frequency during 1978-79. A contract for 3 years was signed with him in February 1979. Less than $\frac{1}{2}$ year before that date a much more generous agreement was reached with him. The following are sections from a report summing up the discussion held in the aircraft industry in the presence of Katz in the fall of 1978. Yitzhaq Sel'a, assistant to the director-general, made the report.

A. For the deals concerning Mr Katz signed before the date on which the minister of defense instructed to limit the commission to 15 percent, a commission of 20 percent;

B. The above-stated also applies to continuous orders provided they and their sums are detailed and constitute an inseparable part of the original contract (signed according to the minister's instruction).

C. For the deals that were or will be signed after the date of the minister's instruction Mr Katz will be entitled only to a commission of 15 percent (except for cases in which there is or will be approval for a higher commission).

D. Computation of the commission with regard to what is stated in the first paragraphs is "from above" (that is, in fact, about 2 percent higher).

E. Mr Bar-Nir, head of the aircraft repair department, expressed his opinion with regard to the level of the commission for aircraft repair deals and noted that in many cases it was impossible to set a commission of 15 percent, because it caused a significant rise in prices. This situation could endanger deals because of the great competition existing in this area.

F. Mr Katz proposed that it be made possible for him to submit proposals including a commission of 15 percent and, if it became clear to him that they were too expensive, he would initiate a drop in the commission rate.

The summation of commissions ends here. The question arises: How did the aircraft industry succeed in persuading its agent to cut these commissions within a very short time and in taking away from him the exclusive right to the "territory" in South America during the recent period?

11,439
CSO: 4805

STORMING OF SACRED MOSQUE, CASE OF NABULUS MAYOR VIEWED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 22 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] The Criminal Incident

The storming of the sacred mosque in Mecca is a criminal act which deserves to be condemned and reviled. It is incompatible with all teachings of the tolerant religion of Islam and every divine religion, and nullifies all pretexts or excuses which could possibly be used by the attackers, whatever their goals or motives and whatever their nationalities and identities.

Carrying weapons and ammunition into the heart of the Moslems' holiest place to frighten the worshipers and shed their blood in a place where killing and fighting are forbidden by God can only mean that those who committed such a criminal act do not know God and do not follow his teachings. Therefore, we detest this action in the strongest possible terms, and we condemn the group of people who violated the sanctity of the ancient house and all those who support them.

On the political side of the incident, the disgust which the action left in its wake makes any political objectives or aspirations which the perpetrators sought to gain from it worthless, because any group which attacks the sacred mosque will not have its views heard and will not find anyone who is interested in what it might have to say.

Nevertheless, what may disturb Saudi officials is the ability of the attackers to smuggle in large quantities of weapons and enter the sacred mosque with such organization without the Saudi authorities being able to discover this. This means that there is a flaw which must be corrected in order to block other attempts to cause disruptions and disturb the Saudi government.

The al-Shak'ah Case and the Court

Today the Supreme Court of Justice will consider the case of Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah in order to render a decision on the request submitted by his wife to prevent his deportation from his homeland.

Even though we have no right to interfere with the course of justice or the decisions of the court, the fact is that reliance on the British emergency statutes to define the position involves a kind of bias, because these statutes are biased to start with.

In any case, the decision of the court remains the last word, and we hope that true justice will triumph in the court of justice.

8591

CSO: 4802

SHI'ITE SHAYKH SHAMS-AL-DIN SPEAKS ON THREAT TO SOUTH

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 9 Nov 79 p 5

[Article by Nazih Naquzi] "Shaykh Shams-al-Din on 'Id al-Ghadir in Sur: The South Can Only Be Saved by the Weapons of Its People; For Weapons Are the Adornments of Men, as Well as Women"]

[Text] Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din states that the south will be saved by its people with weapons. In a speech to residents of the south during a celebration held in the Imam al-Sadiq Club on the occasion of 'Id al-Ghadir [a joyful feastday celebrated by Shi'ites on 18 Dhu al-Hijjah, this year corresponding to 9 November 1979, in memory of the prophet Muhammad's alleged designation of 'Ali as his successor], Shams-al-Din said: "I remind you now of the immortal words of Imam al-Sadr: Weapons are the adornments of men--and of women, too, if need be."

The vice president of the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council began his speech with a discussion of the significance of 'Id al-Ghadir and the proof of this day. He said: "We celebrate today in this brave and patient city one of the greatest anniversaries in Islam, 'Id al-Ghadir. We celebrate this anniversary to renew the meanings and ideals of the jihad in thought, speech, and action."

He said: "The jihad is both negative and positive. The positive jihad involves defying dangers in order to achieve the principles and ideals for which God wants us to be soldiers and representatives on earth. The negative jihad is our own jihad against hopelessness, deviation, appetites and opulence. For us, 'Id al-Ghadir is a symbol of the jihad, perseverance and power."

Shaykh Shams-al-Din also said: "Today, the issue of the motive power of Islam is raised again. For 'Id al-Ghadir is not an occasion peculiar to us, but an important symbol in the history of Islam. The spirit of 'Id al-Ghadir renews life once again in the south and elsewhere so that it springs in thought, speech and action not from a sectarian basis but from a common Islamic basis."

Next, Shaykh Shams-al-Din turned to the Palestine issue: "Palestine is Islamic ground and its people are Moslems who have rejected international and Zionist colonialism and the conspiracy against it. Zionism has swallowed up the land of Palestine and has annexed other territory. And there is the land of the south. We do not know what will happen to it, because when the Arabs confronted the problem they confronted it with a defeatist spirit and by seeking help from a source other than God. They sought help from foreigners and subjected everything to their standards. The result was the loss of Palestine."

He added: "We are now acting on an Islamic basis and out of legal necessity. This is made clear by the actions of the people of the south and the instructions of the Islamic revolution in Iran. We are following these steps. On this occasion, we do not forget the stands taken by Imam al-Sadr in behalf of the Palestinian issue, and we have recorded a tough, unwavering and constant record. I said to our brethen in the resistance: If you betray us or if you perish, Palestine will remain a trust on our shoulders and the shoulders of our descendants."

Under the circumstances which now prevail in Lebanon in general and in the south in particular--and I mean Jabal 'Amil, which is like a very high beacon--we as Lebanese, or Arabs or Moslems in the south are going through a fateful stage, which we call the threats to existence. These threats began in their most repulsive aspect with the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr. The threats to existence are besetting the south from all sides. If you think as Arabs, they are an Arab people. If you think as Moslems, they are a Moslem people. This land may become a new pawn in the hands of Israel to add to its most important pawn, Palestine. And no one can reasonably accept that."

Shaykh Shams-al-Din continued: "The second threat is the threat that the south will be partitioned. This would be permanent and lasting and would lead subsequently to the partitioning of Lebanon."

"The third threat is the threat of settlement, which is a direct plot against Lebanon in the south and against the Palestinian resistance. This threat is constant and definite, and there is no room to doubt it. The seeds of its origin were contained in the Camp David agreements, and now it is suddenly being implemented before everyone's eyes."

He said: "The traditional political action with which the threats in the south are being confronted can not succeed without special action, such as the Arab summit which we called for and supported. Perhaps this summit will be able to work toward a solution to the problem of the south, which has reached the point where it should really be called the problem of the Arabs. The dead are dead and the living live, and the south is in its death struggle. Either it will die, a new people will be driven away, Israel will capture a new pawn, and a new defeat will be recorded for the Arabs; or else the south will be saved and a new and

important victory will be recorded for the Arabs in this era. Will the summit succeed? We pray that God will grant it success, because this success would be the first move toward the prevention of a disaster, since its failure would be a great disaster. For the southerner can no longer wait for another summit to be held."

Shams-al-Din said: "But all of this is to no avail as long as it is not joined to firm action, the existential action carried out by man. That is to say, you inhabitants of the south are the ones who can change the standards and break the decisions, and you are the ones who can save the south and the Arabs. Do not assign anyone to take charge of your case, because the Arabs live by international standards which restrain them and make them impotent. This condition does not fit us at all. For the south will be saved by the southerners with weapons. And here I will mention the immortal words of Imam al-Sadr: 'Weapons are the adornments of men.' I add to this, 'And the adornments of women, if need be.'

"This land which has been ruined in all aspects will never permit the threats to existence to continue and fall to its lot. We will not remain silent about the plot and the impotence which threatens our fate, and we will not be transformed into a displaced people. We may be transformed into a martyred people, and our houses may be transformed into graves, but we will not leave our houses abandoned. What would have happened if the demolished houses in Sur and elsewhere, for which there have still been no reparations--what would have happened if their residents had been martyred in them? Of course, this kind of talk is unpleasant for the residents of these houses, but death here is deliverance for everyone and salvation for everyone. Let me give some important advice to the Arab world, which wants the south to remain steadfast alone while more than a million Arab soldiers live a life in which there is no spirit or will to fight. We made the conference an offer that there could be either a popular war of liberation to free Palestine, or an honorable and comprehensive decision by which the fronts would be opened and all the Arabs would enter, with all the people behind them. At that time, we would have our first fighters and the first martyrs would fall. But if international standards do not permit this, then for whose benefit was the south lost and its people driven away? Thus, the only key is the return of the state to the south, starting with the entry of the Lebanese army. This is the wish of all people, not only in the south but in all Lebanon. For the civil strife has lasted for a long time, and the south must not bear the problems anymore. You, my brethren, say that if the summit conference fails and the south is exposed to peril and loss, this will not be confined to the south and the southerners will not be transformed into herds of goats and fugitives. But they know who is hindering their cause and who is prolonging this cause, and you are taking a position in this situation."

Shams al-Din continued: "An appeal is directed to the conference with regard to Imam Musa al-Sadr, because everyone bears this responsibility and must execute it."

Following Shams-al-Din's speech, the Mufti of Sur, Shaykh Najib Suwaydan, talked about 'Id al-Ghadir and Imam al-Sadr. He said that those who are concealing Imam al-Sadr are seeking to stop the march and silence the voice of the south.

8591

CSO: 4802

LEBANESE UN AMBASSADOR VIEWS UN FORCES IN LEBANON, SYRIA'S STAND

LD271633 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 21 Dec 79 pp 4 6 LD

[Interview with Ghassan Tuwayni, Lebanese UN ambassador, by Muhammad 'Abd al-Mawla in New York--date note given]

[Excerpts] I said: Why are the UN forces in Lebanon, and what has their presence for over 18 months achieved?

[Tuwayni] I believe that the major advantage in the UN forces presence in Lebanon is that they have enabled Lebanon and the world community to evict the Israeli enemy; although he has not been evicted from all Lebanon or from all the territories he occupied, he has at least withdrawn from most of the territories he occupied. I would like here to reassert what I said once before--that Lebanon is the only Arab state that has been able to evict occupying forces by a Security Council resolution. This is one aspect of the advantage due to the presence of these forces.

Another aspect of this advantage is that the forces' presence prevents Israel from launching a major military operation. The UN forces cannot stop Israel from carrying out minor operations, but they prevent a large-scale Israeli occupation or a major Israeli operation.

A third aspect is that the presence of several nationalities within these forces involves the countries whose soldiers form these forces in defending Lebanon against Israeli invasion. Moreover, the participation of these countries in the UN forces creates a contradiction between them and Israel. Some of these countries were friends or allies of Israel but, with time and because of Israel's attitude to the UN forces, have become countries opposing Israeli policy to a great extent.

Finally, there is a fourth positive aspect for the UN forces' presence, that is, they insure an international presence in Lebanon which enables us to seek the world organization's help in maintaining security, not throughout Lebanon but in the south at least, and to involve the world organization in shouldering the responsibility of preserving the integrity of the Lebanese territories and Lebanon's stability and sovereignty.

When Lebanon is ready--and I believe it is now ready--to exercise its sovereignty fully, the UN forces will be able to act more effectively.

Of course, there are several negative aspects in the UN forces' presence, most important of which is that these forces have not played their role fully, bearing in mind that they would have played a greater role had Lebanon played its own role. The forces are here to help Lebanon, and not to take its place. This is a basic element in any appraisal.

[Question] Mr Ambassador, the UN forces came to Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 in order to take over from Israel the territories it occupied during the 10-day war in 1978 and to restore them to Lebanese authority, as well as to help the government to reestablish its authority in the south. Obviously, regardless of the circumstances, the UN forces have failed in their task. Why do we continue with their presence and not consider the question of their withdrawal, to which we must agree?

[Tuwayni] We do not support the forces' presence. Here I am, of course, speaking about what I imagine would be the Lebanese Government's attitude on the eve of renewing the UN forces' mandate. Let us ask this question: What would happen if these forces did not exist?

Supposing the Security Council did not renew the forces' mandate and these forces numbering 6,000 men, were withdrawn: What would happen in southern Lebanon?

In my opinion the most likely scenario, as the contemporary expression is, would be as follows: First, Israel would intervene directly and consolidate and strengthen Sa'd Haddad's position. It would then try to expand the area of this state. Which means a direct clash with the Palestinian Revolution and the return of the situation in southern Lebanon not only to what it was before the UN forces' entry but even to the situation that existed at some stages of the 2-year war. There will be internal clashes and clashes between Palestinians and Lebanese, and probably among some of the Lebanese. Syrian forces will be compelled to intervene. I believe that they would intervene and would go beyond the red line at which they stopped when the Israeli invasion took place in 1978.

Therefore, the minor war which would start in the south would have an effect elsewhere. This is the first possibility. The second possibility is that if the UN forces are withdrawn, which is a political possibility, the United States could pressure Israel not to act. But what guarantee is there that the Lebanese state would be able to take the UN forces' place? If the Lebanese state is unable to restore its sovereignty with the help of the UN forces, will it be able to restore it and exercise its authority in the south without the help of these forces?

There remains, of course, the general Arab element represented by the Palestinian side. I believe that Israel is waiting for the UN forces to withdraw in order to pounce on the Palestinian resistance. The UN forces' presence does not constitute a protection for Israel. This is contrary to what some of the extremists say: They believe that the UN forces' presence is a protection for Israel. I would ask here: Protection from whom and from what?

The UN forces do not and will not prevent Fedayeen action against Israel. The Fedayeen action was never of such a magnitude as to pose a danger to Israel, even before the UN forces' presence. Let us be frank about this.

Therefore, the removal of the UN forces would mean a wide-open door to war. If I may express a personal view in this regard I would say, as Prime Minister al-Huss has said, that Lebanon, which has lost everything in the south, has nothing more to lose in war with Israel. Lebanon will not lose if the UN forces in the south fail and the door to war opens wide. What will explode then will be the whole area. I believe that, after what has happened in Iran and elsewhere, several parties have a real interest in seeing the door to war wide open. Sometimes I wonder if we Lebanese could achieve a solution through war. I wonder if it is not in Lebanon's real interest to let the situation in the south explode and let the UN forces withdraw, in the hope that an explosion will determine the situation and lead the conflicting parties to go as far as they can go.

[Question] Obviously the internationalization of the Lebanese crisis has failed to save Lebanon from its predicament, as did the Arabization of the crisis. The Syrian deterrent forces, which the Arabs have agreed to call the Arab deterrent forces [ADF], did not help to end the Lebanese tragedy. Do you not believe, Mr Ambassador, that all our paths have been blocked?

[Tuwayni] First of all, I do not agree with all that you said in the question: Some parts of the question are an answer. I believe that what has failed in Lebanon is the concept of borrowed security. No state can be built on borrowed security, be it international or Arab or any other nationality. The era when states could hire foreign armies has gone. Therefore, the Lebanese security solution is a political and not a security solution. This solution requires international assistance and Arab detente. There was international detente at the Security Council. Lebanon should have insured that the international detente at the Security Council was reflected in the Lebanese arena; Lebanon failed to match the international detente with Lebanese detente.

When I say Lebanon, I do not mean the Lebanese authorities but all the Lebanese parties, particularly the parties that have no interest in ending the war or the revolution without reaping benefits from it.

[Question] During the General Assembly and Security Council debates Syria adopted a negative, if not an opposing stand toward the UN forces' presence in the south. What is the result of that stand?

[Tuwayni] Syria's attitude was not negative. Syria always votes against the UN forces. It has even voted against the UN forces' presence on its own territory as a matter of principle. There is, however, a particular negative Syrian stand. This is Syria's failure to facilitate the UN forces' task when they first arrived in Lebanon, by not allowing them to expand their deployment area so that UN forces would be close to Syrian forces. The gap which was left between the line where the ADF forces stopped and the line where the UN forces began has become a running sore whose existence, I believe, the ADF command regrets as much as it regrets the existence of the UN forces.

[Question] The Israelis have occupied one-third of the southern territories and struck the Palestinians very hard. Why did the Syrians not move, and why do they not want the UN forces now? Can you explain this situation to us?

[Tuwayni] I believe that the reason why Syria did not intervene when the Israeli invasion took place is that it knew that, if it intervened, it would have fallen in the Israeli trap. The trap was to lure Syria into a confrontation with Israel, after which Israel would ignite the area and start a major war.

[Question] Mr Ambassador, I do not wish to embarrass you, but fear of being lured into war is not a characteristic of those who talk about steadfastness and confrontation. There is the Soviet stand, which also needs explaining. The Soviets have approved the UN forces' presence in the south as well as the presence of the Syrian forces. They support the Palestinians in their continuing military activities in Lebanon, and in the meantime they tell the Lebanese authorities that they support them on the question of Lebanese territorial integrity and the right to restore their sovereignty throughout Lebanese territory. How do you, Mr Ambassador, explain this riddle?

[Tuwayni] This riddle can be explained by studying Soviet policy. The best book published in the Arab world containing such a study is probably Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's book criticizing al-Sadat's policy.

First, I believe that the Soviet Union did not approve of the Syrian army's entry into Lebanon. The Soviet Union adopted a negative stand on this and advised Syria against getting bogged down in the Lebanese quicksands. This is from a historical standpoint. There are always several Soviet stands and not just one single Soviet stand. There is the state policy as well as the party relationship policy. There is also the interests of the communist revolution. In the final analysis it is a changing stand. In other words, Soviet policy is dynamic; this is a characteristic that no other world policy has, be it U.S. policy or the policy of any other state. I believe that, in a general sense, Soviet policy cannot abandon the Palestinian Revolution. The Palestinian Revolution is the primary base or the basic line of every Soviet policy because it is a revolution. But when a

conflict occurs between that revolution and a regime friendly to the Soviet Union, the latter always tries to reconcile the two without feeling compelled to oppose either. When the Palestinian Revolution clashed with the Syrian forces entering Lebanon, this did not lead to the Soviet Union breaking relations with Syria or to its abandoning the Palestinian Revolution. In south Lebanon the Soviet Union is for peace, because it does not want an Arab-Israeli war for fear that such a war could lead to a confrontation between itself and the United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union is against an Arab-Israeli war but at the same time continues to encourage the Palestinian Revolution to remain a live revolution, provided that it does not exceed its limits and go to war, or indeed find itself reduced to the minimum and forced to close down.

With regard to Lebanon the Soviet Union, in my view, probably adheres to the free, liberal system more than many Western countries. The Soviet Union realizes that the Lebanese system gives the communists, even the most extremist among them, freedom of action. Such freedom is not available to them even in the Arab countries closest to the Soviet Union. For example, the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty does not provide the Iraqi Communist Party with freedom similar to that enjoyed by the Communist Party in Lebanon, the country which is accused of being linked to the United States.

It would be naive of the Arabs not to understand this flexibility in Soviet policy and not to behave toward it as a reality that we cannot change.

[Question] Have you noticed, Mr Ambassador, that the United States has become impotent? It has been unable to do anything in Lebanon despite the fact that it has a basic interest in ending the Lebanese crisis. It is now incapable of doing anything in Iran; everybody is pushing it around. What can we hope for from this state which has buried its greatness in Vietnam and Watergate?

[Tuwayni] First, one cannot compare the United States today with the United States of Vietnam, or the United States before Iran and post-Iran. But we must realize that the Iranian crisis has changed the American national feeling and created a new American psychology that nobody can yet probe. The only description that probably applies to it is that which some Americans have been using recently, namely "ante-Vietnam." This, however, does not mean that the United States will go to war tomorrow or that it will become isolationist.

The crisis of U.S. impotence is no subject for analysis here. The problem lies not in U.S. impotence but rather in the fact that some countries, like Lebanon for example, because of U.S. policy cannot afford to admit the need to ask for or accept U.S. assistance. This is because the United States, entangled and paralyzed by its strength, wants to compete with both ally and enemy. It always follows two contradictory courses simultaneously. It was with the shah and with human rights in Iran. This brought down the shah in Iran. It was with Somoza while it was encouraging

the internal forces against him. It brought down Allende's regime, and today at the United Nations it votes against the regime that succeeded Allende and accuses it of violating human rights in Chile. It wants the Arabs' friendship but cannot stop Israel from committing aggression against them. The unnatural U.S. relationship with Israel is such as to create a crisis in the U.S.-Israeli ties. The Arabs may one day achieve their rights and beat the United States because of an explosion in U.S.-Israeli relations before they can triumph against Israel in war or triumph against the United States by allying themselves with its enemy, particularly because it is the Arabs' tragedy that the present regimes are not free to act against the United States. This is not because the United States dominates them or because they rely on it for arms or money or trade, but because if they go to the U.S. adversary they will first, condemn themselves to a change that is not acceptable to them and, second, because that adversary--be it the Soviet Union or China--will not lead them peace with Israel because it lacks the means of influencing Israel. If the Arab countries are heading for war with Israel, their natural ally is the Soviet Union, but if they are heading for peace, the key to peace is not with the Soviet Union but with the United States.

CSO: 4802

GRADUATION OF ARMY NCO CADETS CELEBRATED

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 9 Nov 79 p 5

[Article: "Graduation of Group of Army NCO's; Chief of Staff: 'Do Not Let the Fingers of Destruction Penetrate Your Ranks'"]

[Text] The graduation of a group of army NCO cadets was celebrated yesterday morning at the Hammama base under the direction of Staff Brig Gen Munir Tarabayh, chief of staff.

Attending the ceremony were area commanders and deputies of the chief of staff, as well as commanders of the institutes, schools and services and a large number of command officers.

This class of graduating NCO's was named for the martyred Sergeant First Class Yahya Sharaf-al-Din.

Chief of Staff Brig Gen Tarabayh delivered a speech on this occasion, in which he said: "The battle of reconstruction which you are entering is no less important than any other battle, and your victory in it depends on the extent to which you are prepared to sacrifice and give for the sake of Lebanon. The road of reconstruction is hard, but all of you are fit for it. Why shouldn't this be so, since you are sons from all of Lebanon? All Lebanon has the support and treasure of your guiding principle, a belief in its unity and sovereignty, the refusal to give up an inch of its territory. You renounce all sectarianism, factionalism and regionalism with a heart filled with belief; you are out of the reach of every convulsion.

"I say to you soldiers: in the sea of conflicting currents which surrounds you, strive constantly to accomplish your mission; join arms and do not let the fingers of destruction penetrate your ranks. The painful experience which has happened to Lebanon and its army will not be repeated, and the believer will not be bitten from the same hole twice."

The ceremony was concluded with a military parade led by the army band. The army flag and the platoons participating in the parade followed.

Afterwards, the officers went to the base officers club to exchange toasts.

LEBANON

BANKING STATISTICS REPORTED FOR FOUR-WEEK PERIOD

Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 7, 21 Nov 79

7 Nov 79 p 11

Text The Bank of Lebanon yesterday issued its bimonthly balance sheet for 30 October 1979. In comparison with the 15 October report, it calls for the following remarks.

1. Fiduciary circulation continued its rapid increase from one 2-week period to the next, at the end of October reaching 3,713,243,262.69 LL compared with 3,644,790,309.88 LL, a 1.9 percent increase. This increase does correspond with the rise during the same period in the gold and foreign currency holdings of the Bank of Lebanon, which rose from 2,917,291,482.46 LL to 2,973,062,372.97 on 30 October (an increase of 1.9 percent).
2. At the same time, sight deposits in the Lebanese banking system with the Bank of Lebanon showed a rapid increase of about 8.2 percent, totaling at the end of October 2,403,016,401.90 LL compared with 2,219,795,140.80 LL on 15 October. Consequently, the money supply apparently showed a very significant increase of 4.3 percent in 2 weeks, rising from 5,864,585,450.68 to 6,116,259,664.59 LL, thus causing on the exchange market a definite decline in the conversion rate of the Lebanese pound in relation to other currencies, which will tend to worsen inflationary trends in the country, whose economic situation is already disturbed by the deterioration of the domestic political situation.
3. Other deposits of public and private groups also increased by 1 percent, rising from 1,383,126,581.93 LL to 1,396,584,732.14 on 30 October.
4. Advances to the public sector increased by 100 million Lebanese pounds, increasing the treasury debt to 1,131,144,111.08 LL by the withdrawals of funds made recently from the banking market through 3- and 6-month treasury bonds.

Following is the balance sheet as it was given to L'ORIENT-LE JOUR by the Bank of Lebanon.

	As of 30 Oct 79 in LL	As of 15 Oct 79 in LL
Assets		
1. Gold and foreign currencies	2,973,062,372.97	2,917,291,482.46
2. Advances to the public sector	1,131,144,111.08	1,031,144,111.08
3. Advances to the private sector	67,273,675.29	66,723,342.44
4. Advances under law 28/67	1,076,995.35	1,076,995.35
5. Other holdings and debit accounts	4,186,552,117.48	3,882,992,945.44
Total	8,359,109,272.17	7,899,228,876.77
Liabilities		
1. Sight deposits		
a. Fiduciary circulation	3,713,243,262.69	3,644,790,309.88
b. Sight deposits	2,403,016,401.90	2,219,795,140.80
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	6,116,259,664.59	5,864,585,450.68
2. Other deposits	1,396,584,732.14	1,383,126,581.93
3. Capital	15,000,000.00	15,000,000.00
4. General reserve	263,085,660.55	263,085,660.55
5. Other credit accounts	568,179,214.89	373,431,183.61
Total	8,359,109,272.17	7,899,228,876.77

[21 Nov 79 p 12]

[Text] The Bank of Lebanon yesterday issued its bimonthly balance sheet for 15 November 1979. In comparison with the 30 October report, it calls for the following observations.

1. Fiduciary circulation decreased from one 2-week period to the next by 2.6 percent, dropping from 3,713,243,262.69 LL to 3,617,520,301.96 LL, which corresponds to the decrease in gold and foreign currency holdings of the Bank of Lebanon, which on 15 November amounted to 2,896,139,998.91 LL compared with 2,973,062,372.97 LL on 30 October.

2. Sight deposits of the Lebanese banking system with the Bank of Lebanon showed an 3.2 percent decline, going from 2,403,016,401.90 LL to 2,205,421,856.95 LL. On the contrary, other deposits of public and private groups strongly increased by 21.2 percent, totaling 1,693,214,986.34 LL in mid-November, compared with 1,396,584,732.14 on 30 October.

3. Sight commitments of the Bank of Lebanon decreased by 4.8 percent during this period, dropping from 6,116,259,664.59 LL to 5,822,942,158.91 LL.

4. Advances to the public sector were maintained at 1,131,144,111.08 LL, while advances to the private sector increased by approximately 12 million Lebanese pounds to 79,299,687.01 LL.

Following is the balance sheet as it was given to L'ORIENT-LE JOUR by the Bank of Lebanon.

	As of 15 Nov 79 in LL	As of 30 Oct 79 in LL
Assets		
1. Gold and foreign currencies	2,896,139,998.91	2,973,062,372.97
2. Advances to the public sector	1,131,144,111.08	1,131,144,111.08
3. Advances to the private sector	79,299,687.01	67,273,675.29
4. Advances under law 28/67	1,076,995.35	1,076,995.35
5. Other holdings and debit accounts	4,113,346,764.20	4,186,552,117.48
Total	8,221,007,556.55	8,359,109,272.17
Liabilities		
1. Sight commitments		
a. Fiduciary circulation	3,617,520,301.96	3,713,243,262.69
b. Sight deposits	2,205,421,856.95	2,403,016,401.90
	<u>5,822,942,158.91</u>	<u>6,116,259,664.59</u>
2. Other deposits	1,693,214,986.34	1,396,584,732.14
3. Capital	15,000,000.00	15,000,000.00
4. General reserve	263,085,660.55	263,085,660.55
5. Other credit accounts	426,764,750.75	568,179,214.89
Total	8,221,007,556.55	8,359,109,272.17

7679

CSO: 4800

LEBANON

BRIEFS

STATEMENT ON IRAN-LIBYAN NORMALIZATION--Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, vice president of the Shi'ite Supreme Council, yesterday received Abu Jihad, a member of the Executive Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Afterwards, the Shi'ite Supreme Council official chaired a meeting of the Shi'ite Ulemas, which closed with the release of a communique outlining the "need to continue the efforts made to settle the southern Lebanon problem." The signatories stated that they were "surprised" by the attitude "attributed" to Iranian officials about the affair of the disappearance of the president of the Shi'ite Supreme Council, Imam Musa al-Sadr. He disappeared during a visit to the Libyan Jamahiriya at the end of August 1978, and Tehran has just announced its decision to resume relations with Tripoli, and at the same time to send to Libya a commission to investigate the disappearance of Imam Sadr. /Text/ /Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 16 Nov 79 p 3/ 7679

CSO: 4800

BRIEFS

COMMISSION MEETING WITH ROMANIA--Rabat, Dec 25. (MAP)--The joint Moroccan-Romanian Commission concluded its meeting last Monday by issuing a joint communique. M'hamed Boucetta, Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, and his Romanian counterpart congratulated themselves for the results achieved in compliance with the measures of the first inter-governmental commission for economic and technical cooperation. The minutes of the commission's sessions underlined the necessity of bolstering cooperation in the fields of mining, oil prospection and exploitation, sea ports implementing, the launching of an iron and steel industrial complex and a car and tractor assembly line." [quotation mark as received] The communique also dealt with scientific and cultural-cooperation that will largely be extended in the future accord, as well as agreements concerning merchant navy, transports, sanitary and veterinary cooperation. Regarding the international scene the ministers stressed that "it is by the respect of the equality of rights, independence, national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, banning of armed forces and threats as means to settle conflicts that peace, security, and international cooperation can be secured." [Text] [LD251438 Rabat MAP in English 1205 GMT 25 Dec 79 LD]

CSO: 4420

TEXT OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH USSR REPORTED

Beirut AL-HADAF in Arabic 10 Nov 79 pp 30-31

[Text of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and the PDRY]

[Text] The USSR and the PDRY;

Because they believe that the continued development and strengthening of the relations of friendship and comprehensive cooperation between them are in keeping with the basic national interests of their peoples and serve the cause of strengthening peace and security in the world;

Because they are firmly determined to develop the economic and social gains of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the PDRY and seek to bring about the unity and cooperation of all the forces which struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress;

As they invoke the ideals of struggle against imperialism; colonialism and racism in all its forms and manifestations;

As they attach great importance to cooperation between the two countries in the cause of struggle for a just and permanent peace in the Middle East;

As they affirm their allegiance to the goals and principles of the United Nations charter, including the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial and noninterference in the internal affairs of others;

And out of their desire to promote and bolster the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries--have agreed to the following:

Article One

The two high contracting parties officially declare their determination to bolster the insoluble friendship between the two countries and to continuously develop the political relations and overall cooperation between them on the basis of equal rights, respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference by one party in the internal affairs of the other.

Article Two

The two high contracting parties shall engage in close and comprehensive cooperation toward providing the necessary conditions for safeguarding and developing the social and economic gains of their peoples and respecting each other's sovereignty over all of its natural resources.

Article Three

The two high contracting parties shall endeavor to strengthen and expand the mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them. To this end, the two parties will develop and deepen cooperation between them in the spheres of industry, agriculture, fishing, exploitation of natural resources, planning of national economy and other fields of economy as well as in the preparation of national cadres. The two parties will expand trade and navigation on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit and on the basis of the principle of the most favored nation.

Article Four

The two high contracting parties shall seek to develop cooperation between them and exchange expertise in the fields of science, culture, arts, literature, education, health care, press, radio and television, cinema, tourism, sports and other endeavors. The two sides shall also seek to develop contacts and cooperation among the state agencies, trade unions and other social organizations as well as expand direct contacts among industrial institutions and cultural and scientific organizations with the purpose of gaining a deeper understanding and awareness of the life, work, experience and accomplishments of the peoples of the two countries. The two parties encourage the development of contacts among the workers of both countries.

Article Five

The two high contracting parties shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of the proper agreements being concluded between them in the interest of strengthening their defense capabilities.

Article Six

[Words missing, presumably reading: "The USSR respects"] the policy of nonalignment adopted by the PDRY, which is an important factor in developing international cooperation and peaceful coexistence. The PDRY respects the peaceful foreign policy pursued by the USSR, which aims at consolidating friendship and cooperation with all countries and peoples.

Article Seven

The two high contracting parties shall continue to exert maximum efforts for the sake of safeguarding world peace and the security of peoples,

deepening detente so that it may embrace the entire world and applying it in the form of definite forms of cooperation for the mutual benefit of nations, as well as solving disputed world problems by peaceful means so as to make the principle of the non-use of force an effective law in the life of nations and to eliminate all manifestations of the policy of hegemony and expansion from international relations. The two parties will energetically seek to serve the cause of comprehensive and complete disarmament, including nuclear weapons, under an effective international supervision.

Article Eight

The two contracting parties shall continue together their active struggle against the machinations of imperialism and for the sake of finally stamping out colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations. The two parties will cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving nations to support the just struggle of peoples for freedom, independence and sovereignty.

Article Nine

The two high contracting parties will exert all their strength to seek to secure a just and durable peace in the Middle East and to find a comprehensive settlement in the area in fulfillment of that objective.

Article Ten

The two high contracting parties shall seek to develop cooperation among Asian nations, the establishment of relations of peace, good neighborhood and mutual trust among them and the establishment of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of the joint efforts of the nations of that continent.

Article Eleven

The two high contracting parties shall consult with each other about important international issues which directly pertain to the interests of the two countries. In the event of the emergence of situations which constitute a threat to peace or violation of world peace, the two parties shall seek to hold immediate contacts between them for the purpose of coordinating their positions in order to eliminate the danger or restore the peace.

Article Twelve

Each of the two high contracting parties officially declares that it will not join military or any other pacts and will not participate in any blocs or groupings of states or in actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party.

Article Thirteen

The two high contracting parties announce that the provisions of this treaty do not conflict with their obligations under current international agreements and pledge not to conclude any international agreements which are inconsistent with this treaty.

Article Fourteen

Any issues that may arise between the two high contracting parties with regard to the interpretation or application of any provision prescribed in this treaty shall be settled bilaterally in the spirit of mutual friendship, respect and understanding.

Article Fifteen

This treaty shall remain in effect for 20 years from the day it becomes valid. If any of the two high contracting parties did not express an intention to terminate the treaty 6 months prior to the date of expiry, it shall remain effective for 5 more years, and so on unless one of the two high contracting parties informs the other party in writing of its intention to terminate the treaty 6 months before the expiration of the extra period of 5 years.

Article Sixteen

This treaty shall be ratified and it shall become effective on the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged in the city of Aden. The treaty is in two copies, in both Russian and Arabic. Each text is equally valid.

Set down in Moscow on 25 October 1979.

For the USSR: Leonid Brezhnev, secretary general of the Central Committee of the CPSU, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.

For the PDRY: 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council of the PDRY.

9254

CSO: 4802

OBJECTIVES OF PFLO REVIEWED

Beirut AL-HADAF in Arabic 10 Nov 79 pp 32-33

[Article: "The Continuation of the March Proves the Strength of the Political-Military Line"]

[Excerpts] "The states which seizes the Gulf region and the coast of Oman can rule the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Iran and Africa and can close the Suez Canal and cut off air and sea routes to India and Africa. The Gulf area is at the heart of all our major naval and air routes to the Orient. It contains the ports, trade centers and fueling stations which are necessary for our fleets, ships and aircraft." Raymond (Aushey), British statesman.

People's Liberation War

The revolutionary strategy which was adopted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLO) to carry out the historic tasks was a long-term people's liberation war. Since the beginning of its revolutionary march, it has had to fight two enemies: British and American imperialism whose interests it cannot [sic] destroy by destroying its domestic enemy, despite their material strength, and the lackey compradorian authority sitting on the country's throne.

The language of actual everyday realities which characterizes the history of the PFLO along its long march through 14 years of dogged struggle and armed popular struggle, loudly demonstrates the vitality of the revolution and the soundness of its basic premises, namely, that it is and will continue to be "the fighting spearhead not only of the procession of the people of Oman but also of the struggle of the masses of our people in the entire Gulf and Peninsula region and their struggling national forces. It is the spearhead which is directed at the heart of our people's enemy and the enemy of all struggling peoples, namely, imperialism and reaction." (The 9 JUNE magazine).

In the revolution's long procession, the armed people's revolution, the PFLO was able to maintain its struggle and political positions in most of the liberated areas, and confronted many military expeditions (local and foreign) which were directed against its very armed existence. Those military expeditions (the Al-'Umar expedition, the borders expedition etc) have been defeated and were unable to realize the objectives drawn

drawn up by the leaders of imperialism. The PFLO stood up with unmatched bravery and courage in the face of all forms of the horrible economic siege imposed against it by the Qabus regime and its allies in the area.

In its revolutionary procession, the PFLO was able to shift the flame of the struggle in Oman to various other arenas in the area. It also gave birth to other political organizations (for example, the Popular Front in Bahrain) and was able to achieve a qualitative development in the level of its relations with the Palestinian revolution in its capacity as the main arena of the Arabs' central battle. It has also elevated its relations to the level of strategic alliance and deepened the level of its relations with liberation movements in the world (Vietnam, for example).

The transformation of the balance of international and class relations in the entire Gulf region after the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, which has toppled the imperialist policeman in the Gulf, and after the qualitative evolution (on the levels of struggle and the masses) in the movement of the Gulf masses in Bahrain and Kuwait, has provided suitable historic conditions which would enable the PFLO to go on with its present procession which is designed to detach Oman effectively from imperialist designs and eliminate the interests of imperialism. This detachment cannot be achieved except through firm struggle for economic and political independence--in other words through destroying all the economic and class structures left behind by colonialism.

The new revolutionary move whose political and military potentialities were announced by the PFLO in November 1977 has had a wide and deep response among Arab revolutionaries, especially since the revolutionary move was conscious response to the conditions which arose after the Camp David conspiracy, Sadat's treasonous march and the period of plots hatched by reactionaries allied with imperialism, especially in the Arabian Gulf. The PFLO's perception of its new revolutionary lessons in a scientific and accurate proletarian spirit. The PFLO has affirmed its deep belief in the strategy of people's liberation was as the only means of settling hostile contradictions between peoples and imperialism for the sake of achieving full independence in a national democratic context. The beginning which has been declared by the PFLO in its latest move came after reasserting itself as an armed revolutionary organization and after maintaining and preserving its liberated positions and attending them politically, socially, culturally and in the area of health by means of establishing several schools (six schools), health centers and hospitals, taking care of the family, and showing belief in the role of woman in the revolution by enabling her to participate in all productive activities in the liberated areas in their capacity as production and social units and liberated bases as well. The new beginning has also come after practicing armed action and escalating military operations, following the collapse of the Iranian imperial regime and the striking at the largest possible number of imperialist bases and their foreign mercenary and local forces, by using the tactics of deployment, as well as striking at the vital centers of the Omani economy.

The revolutionary, victorious march of the PFLO, which is struggling for the sake of toppling lackey thrones through the strategy of people's liberation war, will be crowned with victory, because peoples always win in their just struggle against imperialism.

9254

CSO: 4802

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

MECCA INCIDENT--Kuwait--Habib Bourguiba Jr, private adviser to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, is today attributed as saying that he believes a link exists between extremist Islamic groups in Tunisia and last month's storming of the Holy Mosque in Mecca. However, Habib Bourguiba Jr went on to add--in an interview published by AL-WATAN--that the Tunisian authorities had not "up till now found any material evidence in this respect." He said that these groups "cloak themselves in a pretentious form of fanatical Islam, a phenomenon which is not new; these groups use Islam as a cover for the shamelessness and depravity of many of their deceived members." The adviser to the Tunisian President added by saying: "I believe, according to initial deductions, that these groups have a connection with the tragedy which occurred in the Holy Mecca Mosque in Saudi Arabia." He said that the "excesses" of these groups serve the enemy of the Arabs "who, with the emergence of fanatics and extremists, want to distort the image of the Arabs and especially the main cause, Palestine." [Text] [LD250950 Riyadh SNA in Arabic 0725 GMT 25 Dec 79 LD]

CSO: 4402

ALGERIA SEEKING TO INCLUDE POLISARIO IN SAHARAN TALKS

Paris LE MONDE in French 11-12 Nov 79 p 4

[Text] Will a meeting between King Hassan II and President Chadli Bendjedid on the future of Western Sahara ever take place? Or will Algeria, as it just informed Brzezinski, President Carter's special envoy, insist on a four-party negotiation, Algeria, Morocco, POLISARIO Front and Mauritania, or at least a tripartite, if Mauritania keeps out of it? The question can be asked after the recent vote of the UN decolonization committee.

By 83 votes for, five against (Saudi Arabia, Gabon, Guatemala, Morocco and Zaire) and 43 abstentions, the committee adopted a resolution which amplifies the success achieved by Algeria and the POLISARIO in Monrovia. The text "reaffirms the inalienable right of the Western Sahara people to self-determination and independence" and for the first time invites Morocco "to put an end to the occupation of the Western Sahara." It recognizes the POLISARIO Front as "representing the people of the Western Sahara" and recommends that in that capacity the latter "should fully participate in every quest for a just, durable and permanent political solution of the Western Sahara question."

This vote, which should be confirmed in a plenary session, is a hard blow to Moroccan diplomacy even though it was agreed that the front should not be mentioned as the "only" representative of the Saharan people and it was emphasized that the resolution adopted last year, in which the wording was shaded, had won 89 votes.

Rabat's position has not ceased deteriorating on both the diplomatic and military level since exactly 2 years ago when the king had approached, in great secrecy, Houari Boumediene, for the purpose of arriving at a negotiated solution. In proof of his willingness he had appointed his sister, princess Aisha, as his interlocutor. She had met Dr Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim, minister adviser of President Boumediene in Lausanne in 1977. As he had informed me personally (LE MONDE, 19 April) Redha Guedira, adviser to the king, had become his relief.

In the course of seven meetings which took place in the first semester of 1978, the two advisers prepared a draft document which, according to the

Algerians, envisaged the creation of a Saharan state where only the northern frontiers would be discussed by both chiefs of state during a meeting anticipated for 6 July in Belgium. Boumediene was prepared to attend but the king of Morocco did not follow through on this project.

In the meantime this defection had led the Algerian chief of state to suspect the Rabat palace of having inspired the military coup d'etat which had overthrown President Ould Daddah in Nouakchott on 10 July.

Aware of his mistake, Boumediene realized immediately what the possibilities were for him in the change which had taken place in Mauritania. In turn, he was hesitant about a new meeting: in Algiers it is said that if a meeting does not take place, it is not for reasons of health but for political reasons; upon returning from the Arab summit in Damascus where he had played an important role in favor of the Palestinians, Houari Boumediene was reluctant to meet the monarch who had openly supported President Sadat. In addition, he was afraid to demobilize the partisans of the POLISARIO Front who had begun to make sharp tracks in the terrain.

After Boumediene's death, while Morocco was experiencing a tense economic and social situation, Hassan II had returned to the charge. He had made an announcement, among others, that he would go to Monrovia to meet President Chadli, if he would be there. The latter said nothing but went to the OAU summit, while the sovereign changed his mind at the last moment as he had an inkling no doubt that a development in favor of the POLISARIO Front would occur since the committee of the wise men had come out, without beating about the bush, for the institution of self-determination.

CIA Leaks

Since then, numerous emissaries had gone to Algiers and Rabat, while others went back and forth between the two capitals, like President William Tolbert, practicing president of the OAU, to urge the king of Morocco to negotiate before it was too late. Moreover, President Tolbert had obtained the king's agreement to participate at the next committee of the wise men whose meeting had been scheduled for 27 and 28 November but postponed to the beginning of December.

In a recent report which obviously had been leaked, the CIA stresses the dangers which according to them threaten the throne. Even if this "leak" is a part of the small war which is being waged in the United States by partisans and adversaries, for and against deliveries of arms to Rabat, it should still be taken as a warning.

No doubt, to show himself in a better posture, the sovereign launched the operation OHOUE (LE MONDE, 7 November), in order to raise the morale of the army and to attempt to retrieve the positions evacuated voluntarily or abandoned, following the Polisario Front's attacks in Mahbes, Farsia, Jdiria, etc.

In fact, according to the Saharans, the royal armed forces in the coastal zone hold only El-Aioun, Smara, Bou-Craa, Dakhla, and in the interior, chiefly Guelta-Zemmour. Regaining a few strong positions would unquestionably constitute a money exchange in a bargaining eventuality.

In the meantime there are hints on the Algerian side that the king wishes to meet President Chadli Bendjedid at the next Arab summit in Tunis on 20 November, this framework being more favorable than the African context. However, it is not quite sure that Algeria will favor it. It is said that it will only accept this type of a meeting if a definite date is set, in order to avoid a strictly bilateral negotiation in which the sovereign would seek to obtain advantages in the Western Sahara in exchange for the ratification by his parliament of the Algero-Moroccan frontier. The Algerian objective would be based on the OAU and UN resolutions to prepare the way for the purpose of reaching a negotiation in which the POLISARIO Front could participate.

7993

CSO: 4400

WESTERN SAHARA

POLISARIO CLAIMS ATTACK NEAR BOU-CRAA

Paris LE MONDE in French 11-12 Nov 79 p 4

[Text] In a communique circulated in Algiers on Friday 9 November and reported by our correspondent, the POLISARIO announced that on 5 November their forces attacked stations 2 and 3 of the transport conveyor connecting the deposits from Bou-Craa to the Atlantic coast. The installations were presumably completely destroyed and 60 soldiers of the royal armed forces were killed in these combats.

King Hassan II had mentioned this attack in a speech he made on 6 November on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the "green march" (LE MONDE, 8 November). According to the sovereign heavy losses were sustained by the Saharans in this raid, with 150 dead and 10 taken prisoners.

According to REUTER, which quotes the newspapermen who were on the spot, about 500 Saharan soldiers which were encircled by the Moroccan troops near Bou-Craa were drowned as they tried to cross a river while fleeing. After last month's torrential rains in the desert the bed of this river which is normally dry had been transformed into a muddy stream where many vehicles attempting to escape were bogged down.

A small group of prisoners were presented to the press, six were blindfolded and four were in the hospital. The newspapermen declared that they had seen large quantities of equipment of Soviet origin which had been captured from the POLISARIO.

7993

CSO: 4400

ALGERIA WARNS MOROCCO ABOUT OPERATION 'OHOUD'

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Nov 79 p 8

[Text] Contrary to The POLISARIO Front (LE MONDE, 7 November) the Algerian leaders seem to have taken operation "OHOUD" seriously. This operation had been set in motion by order of Hassan II.

In a long commentary which was circulated on Wednesday 7 November, the APS official agency asked this question: These rockets, these formidable tanks, these guns, these airplanes which are moving towards the Algerian frontier, are they destined to drive back a few units of the POLISARIO Front, or is it an alibi to draw near Tindouf and attack Algeria? The Algerian commentator also wonders "if the United States who brought into force, equipped and financed the first march, are not at the bottom of this new operation in order to destabilize the whole region and neutralize a country which represents the strongest link in the front which turned down a separate Egypt-Israel pact imposed by Washington?"

In any case Algeria is ready to take up the challenge. The APS communique is dated symbolically from Maghnia, an Algerian border city, facing the Moroccan city of Oujda, which makes it very clear that if the fighting takes place it would not be limited only to the region of Tindouf. Furthermore, the agency states "Since 1975 Algeria has never stopped repeating that there are no contentious matters which oppose it to Morocco...but it cannot negate itself by disavowing the principles which were theirs since 1 November 1954. It will remain faithful to them until the very end of their resources. As to the leaders of the SDAR (Saharan Democratic Arab Republic), the APS finally affirms that they have come face to face with other conspiracies; the road is marked out for the Saharan revolution: fight, again fight in the Western Sahara and in the heart of Morocco itself until rights and liberty, rights and justice and rights and honor are established..."

While rejecting any offer for an Algerian-Moroccan dialog which would be held on the Saharan's back, Algiers refused for the time being, to dramatize the situation. The APS communique was not heard on Wednesday

evening on the radio. The Algerian leaders are abstaining, it would seem, as they have done many times in the past, to send messages to the nonaligned, to the OAU and to the secretary general of the United Nations. Finally if the Political Bureau met on Wednesday morning, the communique circulated on that occasion only indicated that "international questions had been reviewed, especially those pertaining to that region in the light of the discussions held by the president of the republic with the chiefs of state and governments, and chiefs of delegations who took part in the ceremonies organized in honor of the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of 1 November 1954."

7993

CSO: 4400

WESTERN SAHARA

COMMUNIST PARTIES' SUPPORT FOR POLISARIO

Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Nov 79 p 6

[Text] A solidarity meeting with the Saharan people was held on Thursday night 15 November in the reciprocity palace in Paris, under the chairmanship of Marchais, secretary general of the FPC (French Communist Party) in the presence of Malainine Ould Sadek, member of the political bureau of the POLISARIO Front, and Ignacio Gallego and Giovannie Papatrieto, respectively representing the Spanish and Italian CP. The packed hall demonstrated its support of the POLISARIO Front on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Madrid tripartite agreement, whereby according to the terms of the agreement, Morocco and Mauritania shared the Spanish Sahara.

The speakers stigmatized "American imperialism which is arming Morocco" and "French intervention on the side of the aggressors of the Saharans." Malainine stated that "two-thirds of the Saharan territory had been liberated at the present time" and he recalled "the recent diplomatic successes achieved by the Arab-Saharan democratic republic."

Before the meeting a few Moroccans had come to proclaim their "willingness to defend Morocco's territorial integrity" and to protest against the interference of the French, Italian and Spanish communist parties in Morocco's domestic affairs."

7993

CSO: 4400

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

28 Jan 80

DD.